All China can do is wait

For years, official Chinese rhetoric has framed the relationship with Iran through the language of shared civilizational heritage and mutual resistance to Western dominance. Bilateral ties, stretching back more than half a century, were formalized in 2021 through a comprehensive strategic partnership promising up to $400 billion in Chinese investment over twenty-five years. Yet the depth of that relationship has always been difficult to measure, and the ongoing conflict is now exposing precisely how transactional, rather than transformational, the Sino-Iranian partnership actually is. The conflict is revealing the true nature of this relationship with China’s strategy being to remain on the sidelines and benefit from the outcome without shaping it.

Beijing’s response to the strikes was formally condemnatory. While Chinese officials issued statements criticizing the attacks, it was Washington, not Beijing, that postponed a planned bilateral summit between the two powers. By remaining reactive rather than proactive, Beijing preserves flexibility, avoids unnecessary confrontation, and positions itself to benefit indirectly from shifts in the regional balance of power.

According to Maria Papageorgiou from LSE, China’s engagement with Iran is best understood as predominantly economic rather than military. The relationship centers on Iranian oil exports to China, while Tehran also occupies a strategic role within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly as a land-based alternative to vulnerable maritime routes. This dynamic was further institutionalized through the 2021 strategic partnership agreement. Historically, Beijing avoided direct arms transfers to Iran following the imposition of UN sanctions in the mid-2000s, and even after their removal in 2020, its involvement has largely been limited to supplying components and dual-use technologies. Although reports have suggested the existence of barter arrangements exchanging Iranian oil for Chinese air defense systems and anti-ship missiles, these claims have been officially rejected by Beijing. In the context of the US-Israeli operation, China has largely confined its response to diplomatic condemnation. For example, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi condemned the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the “blatant killing of a sovereign leader,” yet China has notably refrained from any tangible intervention or coercive diplomatic measures.

An unequal relationship

Understanding China’s current posture requires revisiting the foundations of the asymmetric Sino-Iranian relationship. China provides economic engagement and selective arms transfers but has avoided extending security guarantees to Iran comparable to those historically offered by the United States to its regional partners, even as the credibility of such U.S. guarantees has come under growing scrutiny. When Iran has needed deterrence or defense, Beijing has been unreliable.

Iran exports roughly 90% of its oil to China, making Chinese demand the single most important factor sustaining the Iranian economy under Western sanctions. Yet Iranian crude accounts for only around 13% of China’s total oil imports, often purchased at discounted rates. The relationship is, in this respect, not one between equals. Iran depends on China far more than China depends on Iran, and Beijing’s behavior during the current crisis reflects its awareness of that leverage.

China has also been diversifying energy supply chains and has accumulated substantial strategic reserves of oil, food, and fertilizers. These preparations reflect a longer-term adjustment to the risks of overdependence on any single supply corridor or political relationship, accelerated by the experience of Western sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Is China the winner?

Nevertheless, recognizing China’s constraints should not obscure the genuine opportunities the conflict is generating for Beijing. As David Hutt with DW explains, investors and analysts anticipate that rising global demand for renewable energy technologies will benefit Chinese firms, which already hold dominant positions in electric vehicles, battery manufacturing, hydropower, and solar infrastructure. Across Southeast Asia, China has embedded itself deeply in regional energy transitions, and higher fossil fuel prices tend to accelerate the economic demand for the Chinese alternative.

The conflict has intensified anti-American sentiment across the Global South, where rising energy prices are imposing real economic pain. As the United States is increasingly perceived as a disruptive and unpredictable actor, China benefits from the contrast, positioning itself as a comparatively stable partner committed to multilateralism and non-interference. This positioning costs Beijing little and reinforces its appeal at a time when Washington’s credibility is being tested.

Yet this position has its limits. Beijing’s much-celebrated brokering of the 2023 Saudi Iranian rapprochement illustrated its capacity for regional diplomatic initiative, but that achievement now looks less durable. Diplomatic influence that is not backed by security capacity tends to erode when conflicts intensify and China’s unwillingness to provide hard security constrains its ability to shape outcomes. Despite this, China, alongside Pakistan and other actors, are playing a mediator role in the interest of implementing a ceasefire.

The conflict carries longer-term implications for China. According to Eline Ribakova with the Peterson Institute for International Economics, should the United States succeed in decisively weakening Iran’s regional influence or reshaping its political orientation, China’s diplomatic investments in the region could be significantly undermined. Initiatives including the Saudi Iranian rapprochement, Iran’s integration into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and its BRICS membership would lose momentum, weakening the multilateral architecture through which China has sought to build an alternative to Western-led institutions.

Conversely, a U.S. withdrawal from the conflict, driven by domestic political pressure, rising costs, or Iranian resilience, could create meaningful space for expanded Chinese influence. The precedent of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan demonstrated how rapidly American disengagement can reshape regional dynamics, and how quickly other actors can fill the resulting vacuum. China took careful note of that episode and has reason to believe the pattern could repeat itself. Furthermore, sustained U.S. military engagement diverts attention, resources, and planning capacity away from the Indo-Pacific. Flashpoints such as Taiwan and the South China Sea become less immediate as Washington’s attention is drawn elsewhere.