Berri: Take the weapons and leave us the “governance”

Source: Nida Al Watan

There appears to be a rift in the relationship between Speaker Nabih Berri and one of the rival wings within Hezbollah; the wing most closely aligned with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This rift can be discerned through several indicators, beginning with the well-known statement addressed to the 3 presidents and its implications, which reflected a kind of curtailing of the parliament speaker’s role in negotiations; moving through the renewed invocation of the disappeared Imam Musa al-Sadr, coinciding with the emergence of new historical and media material and the instrumentalization of his ideological disagreement with Imam Khomeini, particularly on the issue of Wilayat al-Faqih, as polemical material between the two Shiite constituencies; and culminating in the recent outbreak of a “leaks war” between the two sides.

At the core of this rift is a divergence in priorities. In addition to the absence of external funding for reconstruction as long as weapons remain, Speaker Berri, the seasoned political tactician, recognizes that there is a major American decision to end Iranian influence in the region, and that the options under consideration to implement this decision are harsh, including granting a green light to an Israeli operation to strip the “party” of its weapons. Accordingly, he is working to leverage his broad network of relationships and long political experience, combined with the tools at hand, to craft a settlement that would pave the way for the Shiites’ entry into a post–Hezbollah-weapons era.

According to information, the settlement Berri is pursuing is based on developing the Taif Agreement to reach a revised version that takes into account the future of the Shiites and their role, through the adoption of “expanded administrative decentralization.” This would grant the people of the South assurances that dispel fears of displacement and make them partners in managing their region and the projects proposed for it, foremost among them the “Trump Economic Zone,” in exchange for securing a constitutional exit for handing over the “party’s” weapons to the state, in line with the philosophy of Taif.

This would be accompanied by a new electoral law consistent with the divisions approved in the agreement and amenable to administrative adjustments. Berri knows there is external pressure to change the electoral law, in keeping with the Lebanese custom of producing a new law with each transitional phase to reflect shifts in the balance of power. As previously noted, the speaker is seeking to postpone the parliamentary elections for two years to grant himself the time needed to put the Shiite internal house in order, in return for facilitating the adoption of a new law in whose birth and rules he would be a partner.

Information indicates that Berri pledged to international envoys that the “party” would hand over drones and missiles to the army, but he showed firmness regarding the issue of authority and the Shiites’ role in the system, on the basis of “take the weapons and leave us the governance,” stressing that he cannot accept the Shiites losing both weapons and power at the same time. This largely aligns with the Iraqi situation, where Popular Mobilization factions and Iran-aligned currents refrained from engaging in military confrontation in order to preserve power, amid discussions that emerged after the change in Syria highlighting “federalism” as an option should conditions deteriorate.

Given that Lebanon’s system is complex and composite, and that many external and internal factors tilt the balance of power one way or another, there is, from the perspective driving this settlement, no serious guarantee for preserving Shiite influence in Lebanese decision-making other than expanded decentralization.

According to an informed political source, the imprint of this settlement can be observed in Sheikh Naim Qassem’s recent speech. By saying that his party does not hand over its weapons to America or Israel, he left a window open for the option of handing them over to the state, whereas the report published by Tasnim News Agency, close to the Revolutionary Guard, about the reception by the Supreme Leader’s adviser, Ali Velayati, of the “party’s” accredited ambassador in Iran, Abdallah Safieddine, confirmed an outright rejection of handing over the weapons.

This report is a translation of the hardline stance of the Revolutionary Guard, tied to the wing directly affiliated with it within the “party,” and its refusal to make concessions—going so far as to increasingly target Berri, alongside an intensified propaganda campaign about rebuilding capabilities and preparing for a new round of war, at a time when priority is given to the faltering expansionist project of the mullahs.

However, this settlement requires Arab and international cover, because tampering with the Taif Agreement, even through cosmetic adjustments to adapt it to changing circumstances, is considered unacceptable. Therefore, Speaker Berri is seeking, through open channels of dialogue and communication with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the United States, to persuade them to proceed with it, arguing that it constitutes the best solution to protect the Shiites from a severe calamity and to enable Lebanon to successfully traverse the transitional phase amid an atmosphere of stability.