An exclusive interview with Middle East Institute Senior Fellow Fadi Nicholas Nassar examines why many in Washington believe Lebanon has a historic opportunity to restore sovereignty, disarm Hezbollah, and reshape the regional balance of power through renewed U.S. engagement.
Washington, D.C. - For decades, Lebanon was battered by war, economic collapse, and Hezbollah’s grip as Iran’s key proxy. But on July 21, 2026, everything changed: President Joseph Aoun, strengthened by recent gains, met President Trump at the White House in a summit that could reshape the Middle East.
This summit launched a new U.S.-backed push to disarm Hezbollah, restore Lebanese sovereignty, resolve border issues with Israel, and advance reforms under the June 2026 Trilateral Framework Agreement.
Further supporting this approach, the Middle East Institute (MEI) released a report last week titled “A Strategy to Win Lebanon,” which lays out expert analysis and detailed recommendations. The report was circulated to the U.S. Congress as a memo and personally presented to President Aoun during his meeting with leading policy experts in Washington.
Fadi Nicholas Nassar, Senior Fellow at MEI and editor of the report, calls Lebanon “the front line in America’s broader contest with Iran.” In an exclusive interview with The Beiruter, Nassar describes a fleeting but genuine chance:
Lebanon is now the clearest opening to convert America’s investments into strategic gains and permanently dislodge the Islamic Republic from its most important regional stronghold.”
For much of the last forty years, Hezbollah seemed invincible. It was the “Party of God,” a state within a state, a resistance movement that claimed to defend Lebanon from Israel. But the mythology has collapsed. As Nassar points out,
Most Lebanese now see Hezbollah not as a defender, but as a foreign agent, a militia fighting Iran’s wars at Lebanon’s expense.
The data is stark. In the summer of 2025, a Gallup poll revealed that 86% of Lebanese did not support war with Israel on behalf of foreign causes, and nearly four in five wanted Hezbollah’s arsenal dismantled. “Its weapons-Lebanese have learned at staggering cost-cannot achieve the militia’s stated objectives; they invite rather than resist occupation,” Nassar says. “The group’s old playbook, threatening civil war, mobilizing sectarian fear, has failed. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), for the first time in decades, have repeatedly dispersed Hezbollah’s attempts at street dominance.”
The turning point came in 2024. Israel’s military campaign killed the group’s long-standing chief, Hassan Nasrallah, and shattered much of its infrastructure. Hezbollah’s losses were catastrophic, but the political fallout was even more profound. “Hezbollah’s legitimacy is eroded, its leadership decimated, and its ability to deter Israel has vanished,” Nassar says. “Even the group’s Shi’a base is questioning its purpose.”
But victory on the ground, Nassar warns, is only part of the battle. “Disarming Hezbollah’s military wing is not enough,” he insists. “The real challenge is dismantling the economic ecosystem and deep state that sustains it.” He points to the group’s mastery of state capture: control over Lebanon’s cash economy, deep penetration of the judiciary, and entrenched positions in ministries that enable the flow of Iranian money.
Hanin Ghaddar, a leading expert on Hezbollah, echoes Nassar’s concerns. “Impunity is Hezbollah’s greatest political asset, and the militia’s deep reach into the state is protected by a thorough infiltration of the judicial system.” Since the early 1980s, Hezbollah has eliminated rivals, intimidated opponents, and used violence to bend the Lebanese state to its will, most notably in 2008, when it forced the government to capitulate through the Doha Agreement.
Even today, Nassar notes, “allies in the state’s financial institutions, from the Ministry of Finance to the Council of the South, ensure a steady flow of cash from Iran. Unless this system is broken, Hezbollah’s defeat will never be permanent.”
The regional balance has shifted: Iran's long-dominant proxy network is now on the defensive after Assad’s fall, Hezbollah’s losses to Israel, and U.S. pressure. Nassar notes that Hezbollah can finally be defeated, and the region is ready for its end.
Still, Nassar warns, Iran is “doubling down, pouring resources into Lebanon to rebuild the crown jewel of its proxy network.” Tehran’s desperation is evident.
“Iran’s gamble can be made to backfire,” Nassar says, but only if Washington acts with urgency. He points to a rare admission by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of the Iranian Parliament, who recently conceded that “more Lebanese had died for Iran than Iranians.” For Nassar, it’s confirmation that “Hezbollah serves Iranian interests, not Lebanese.”
President Trump has warned Iran to rein in its proxies in Lebanon or face renewed U.S. action, a pivotal shift as even Tehran can no longer deny its role.
Central to this moment is the June 2026 Trilateral Framework Agreement, signed by the U.S., Israel, and Lebanon. For the first time, Iran and Hezbollah are excluded from the negotiating table. “Instead of the old model, endless ‘deconfliction’ with Iran and Hezbollah, this agreement disposes of that linkage,” Nassar says. “Only Israel, Lebanon, and the U.S. are parties.”
The Framework maps out sequential steps: disarming Hezbollah, enabling the LAF to restore full Lebanese sovereignty, and linking Israeli withdrawal to verified disarmament and deployment. But, as security expert Matthew Levitt notes, “the whole agreement comes down to implementation and verification.” This time, the U.S. is not just a facilitator but a direct partner, committed to a robust verification mission, intelligence support, and sustained pressure.
Implementing a verification mission is key, Nassar says. “The United States is uniquely placed to play that role. The verification mission ensures that Israel has withdrawn its forces and that the LAF has prevented Hezbollah from moving in. This builds confidence, facilitates successful disarmament and withdrawal, and guarantees Lebanon’s sovereignty and Israel’s security.”
As Nassar notes, “Only the Lebanese can reclaim their country. And they want to. What Washington can do is ensure they succeed.” He argues that the United States and its Lebanese and regional partners should align on a single campaign to restore Lebanese sovereignty, one that clearly identifies Iran and Hezbollah as obstacles, legitimizes the tough steps needed to do so, and establishes disarmament as a national cause. “This approach could also serve as a model for other states seeking to reclaim sovereignty from Iranian proxies,” he adds.
Can the (LAF) actually disarm Hezbollah? Kenneth Pollack, a longtime U.S. policy advisor, is blunt: “Hezbollah has made it clear that it will not disarm voluntarily, even by order of the Lebanese government.” Pollack further notes that despite the LAF’s 90,000-strong force, it remains inexperienced and “partially infiltrated by Hezbollah operatives.”
Nassar, for his part, is adamant that only American engagement can tip the scales. “The U.S. must increase its support for the LAF, since Hezbollah will not relinquish its arsenal without a fight. That means deploying American advisors and trainers, providing intelligence, logistics, special forces, and fire support, replicating the successful U.S. support model used with the Iraqi armed forces against ISIS, but without deploying American combat troops.”
Pollack outlines a spectrum of U.S. support options, from a large-scale “Surge” with U.S. troops to an Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR-light) model focused on advisors, special forces, and air support. “The more robust the American commitment, the faster and more decisive the campaign to disarm Hezbollah and ensure it cannot return,” he writes in his analysis in the July 2026 MEI report, titled “Setting the Lebanese Armed Forces Up for Success.”
For Nassar, cutting off Hezbollah’s financial lifelines is as important as military support. “Since the country’s financial crisis in 2020, the banking sector has been replaced by an unregulated, cash-based financial system, dominated by money service businesses (MSBs), exchange houses, and informal transfer networks,” he explains. These networks allow Hezbollah to launder Iranian money and bypass sanctions.
Nassar insists that “Washington should sanction exchange houses and facilitators moving Iranian funds to Hezbollah, as well as the compromised judges who shield the group. It should also raise the cost for any allies who allow Hezbollah to capture state institutions and block any deals that would trade disarmament for integration into official Lebanese institutions.”
Judicial reform is equally vital. “Sanctioning judges who are complicit in protecting the group and attacking its opponents can help change this dynamic, especially if it occurs in parallel with efforts by the Lebanese state to remove these judges and reform the military court to end civilian prosecutions,” Nassar says. Without these changes, Hezbollah will “keep calculating that it can coerce Lebanese and get away with crime and terror.”
Hezbollah relies heavily on political allies like the “Amal Movement,” led by Speaker Nabih Berri, to maintain its grip on power. “Without ‘Amal,’ Hezbollah would not have had sufficient access to state institutions, and without Hezbollah, ‘Amal’ would lose municipal and parliamentary elections and have limited access to Hezbollah’s financial networks,” Nassar points out. Berri blocks reforms, stymies investigations, and provides institutional legitimacy for Hezbollah. Breaking this alliance is essential for real reform.
Ferid Belhaj, a former World Bank official, warns that Lebanon’s recovery must not repeat previous failures, in which donor money flowed without reform, or in which reform promises stalled disbursement. Nassar agrees: “The new approach must design an architecture that simultaneously strengthens Lebanese institutions, creates credible accountability, and resists capture by the structures that contributed to the country’s collapse.” Aid should be disbursed against verifiable milestones, with civil society oversight and transparency.
In our conversation, Nassar lays out what “winning” in Lebanon would mean for the United States. “Winning means securing a truly sovereign Lebanese state, ending the Israel-Lebanon conflict once and for all, and dismantling Iran’s proxy model at its source in Lebanon. Achieving this would set the stage for a broader transformation of the Levant and establish a new regional order led by America’s partners, effectively limiting Iran’s ability to reverse its setbacks.”
He is clear-eyed about the challenge: Yes, Lebanon and the region have what it takes to defeat Hezbollah if the Lebanese state, its people, regional powers, and the US are united. But the window is closing as Iran increases support to save “the crown jewel of its proxy network.”
Nassar is direct: “If Washington falters, handing Lebanon back to Iran would restore the belief that Iranian resistance can outlast American will at precisely the moment it is within Washington’s power to extinguish it.” The formula for lasting security, he says, is clear: “Hezbollah disarmed, Israeli forces withdrawn, and Lebanon exerting full authority over its territory. Washington must hold that line and deny Iran the spoiling role it has always played.”
As President Joseph Aoun leaves the White House, the world is watching. Nassar’s words echo as both a warning and a call to action: “The defeat of Hezbollah will reverberate far beyond Lebanon. The triumph of the Lebanese state will signal to every capital seeking to break free from Iran’s proxies that reclaiming sovereignty is not only necessary but achievable. The fall of Assad showed the region that Iran’s order could be reversed; the fall of Hezbollah will show that it cannot be rebuilt.”
But if America blinks, he warns, “the window will close, and history will remember not just the chance that was lost, but the region that was left behind.”
For the first time in decades, Lebanon stands at the crossroads. This time, America holds the key.
