The 1994 decree that shook Lebanese identity

Source: Nida Al Watan

In Lebanon, the relationship between the citizen and the state often appears fragile. Rights and services are not always administered as vested entitlements; rather, they are frequently influenced by balances of power and patronage networks. In this context, Collective Naturalization Decree No. 5247, issued on 20 June 1994, constituted the largest naturalization operation in the history of modern Lebanon. It was a pivotal milestone whose impact extended beyond granting citizenship to tens of thousands of people; it also produced a form of unstable citizenship that remained for many years vulnerable to legal challenge, review, partial annulment, or revocation, and became tied to successive political, judicial, and administrative decisions.

This is not merely the story of a decree; it is the story of a state that manages identity through files and dossiers: a sweeping decree, a challenge before the Council of State, a judicial decision referring the review process to the Ministry of Interior, committees that stumble, then decrees revoking citizenship, followed by new challenges. At its core, the same question continues to resurface: How does citizenship in Lebanon remain suspended between politics, administration, and the judiciary? And how does nationality sometimes become a lever of influence and a demographic weapon?

This issue extends beyond Lebanon’s borders. It can be viewed as a model for the use of identity to alter demographic realities and construct new balances of power. What neighboring Syria is witnessing today intersects with this case, as recent trends have emerged advocating the withdrawal and revocation of Syrian citizenship from many of those to whom it was granted by the Assad regime, particularly those brought in to fight on its side. The aim is to nullify the effects of forced demographic change and the manipulation of demographic balances that the Syrian regime deliberately engineered and entrenched over the past years.

Background to 1994: Post-war Lebanon and a decision made under political constraints

The 1994 decree was issued during the post-Taif Agreement period, when the Lebanese state was being restructured politically and administratively amid extensive Syrian influence over Lebanese political life. At that time, Interior Minister Bashara Merhej held direct administrative authority over civil-status matters, and his name became associated with the decree as the minister who signed it.

Within that context, the Syrian regime pushed for the adoption of the decree in pursuit of strategic objectives that went beyond its immediate administrative dimension. On the one hand, the decree was used to engineer the political and electoral landscape by creating new voting blocs loyal to those who had granted them citizenship, thereby helping strengthen the position of Lebanese forces allied with Damascus in Parliament. On the other hand, accusations and concerns emerged that the decree introduced groups perceived politically and from a security perspective as a demographic reserve that could, in the future and in a “natural” manner, contribute to an objective alliance of minorities aligned with the Syrian regime. Added to this was what some considered an attempt to dilute Lebanon’s independence-oriented tendency that opposed Syrian hegemony, by establishing demographic and social interconnections that would make disentanglement between the two countries more difficult.

Because citizenship in Lebanon is not merely a neutral administrative measure but also a political, electoral, social, and sectarian force, the decree quickly became a source of contention between those who viewed it as a step toward correcting a historical injustice suffered by groups that had lived as de facto citizens without nationality, and those who regarded it as a dangerous process of social and demographic transformation serving external agendas.

What did the decree cover? 4 categories and more than 80 nationalities

Although the transparency surrounding the decree’s issuance remained the subject of widespread criticism, the understanding that later became established in discussions of the file indicates that the decree was officially published containing approximately 88,000 names. However, many of these names belonged to men and heads of households whose family members acquired citizenship by dependency. Consequently, the actual number of beneficiaries was estimated at more than 200,000 individuals distributed across more than 50,000 files. These individuals fell into four principal categories:

Unregistered persons (Maktoumi al-Qayd): among the most prominent were the tribes of Wadi Khaled and the northern and eastern border regions; nomadic Arabs who had settled in Lebanon for decades without official documentation.

Holders of “Under Study” registration cards (Qayd al-Dars): this category included a large segment of Lebanon’s Kurdish population residing in Beirut, particularly in areas such as Karantina and later Wadi Abu Jamil, in addition to Palestinians.

Residents and descendants of the Seven Villages: villages detached during the Mandate period and incorporated into Israel, which had historically formed part of Lebanese regions and whose nationality status remained disputed.

Foreign nationals holding citizenship from more than 80 countries

According to the official narrative advanced by the state in its initial defense, the objective was to formalize the citizenship of groups that had developed a genuine and longstanding connection with the Lebanese state over several decades. However, the subsequent political climate was marked by accusations that the decree was driven by political and electoral motives, including bribery, favoritism, and the activation of patronage networks aimed at producing new electoral blocs.

According to opponents, the danger lay in electoral engineering and demographic redistribution. The authorities at the time were accused of allocating large numbers of naturalized persons to sensitive electoral districts such as Zahle, Beirut, Metn, and parts of northern and southern Lebanon in order to create decisive voting blocs capable of altering electoral maps and influencing political outcomes.

Naturalized persons by sect: Maronites and Druze among the smallest groups

To illustrate the scale of the impact and the acute demographic and sectarian imbalance created by the decree, detailed figures indicate that Naturalization Decree No. 5247 effectively granted Lebanese citizenship to 202,527 individuals, distributed among Lebanon’s legally recognized sects, according to the International Information Center, while other sources estimate the figure at around 150,000.

Despite this large number, Maronites and Druze received the smallest shares relative to their respective populations, while the largest share went to Sunni Muslims, who accounted for 58.5% of all naturalized persons. The figures were distributed as follows:

Total naturalized Muslims: 159,011 persons

Sunnis: 118,295

Shiites: 28,425

Alawites: 7,954

Druze: 4,337

Total naturalized Christians: 43,516 persons

Greek Orthodox: 10,736

Armenian Orthodox: 9,977

Greek Catholics (Melkites): 6,617

Syriac Orthodox: 5,568

Maronites: 2,725

Armenian Catholics: 2,526

Syriac Catholics: 1,313

Various denominations: 1,243

Chaldeans: 1,141

Latins: 1,135

Protestants: 535

These figures clearly show that Muslims constituted nearly 78% of the naturalized population, while Christians accounted for approximately 21%, a disparity that sparked extensive demographic controversy. Some estimates suggest that, through natural population growth, the actual number of naturalized persons and their descendants reached between 300,000 and 350,000 individuals.

It is also worth noting that the Ministry of Interior, under Minister Michel Murr, prepared an annex to the decree intended to address this demographic imbalance affecting the Christian sects. However, this annex never saw the light of day and was never issued.

The legal challenge: From judicial review to the practical suspension of rights

Even in cases where individuals were arguably entitled to Lebanese nationality by birth, such as some unregistered persons who were born and raised in Lebanon, the mass naturalization process created a distinct legal and social reality. A naturalized citizen does not always stand on equal footing with a person whose nationality is original by birth, because Lebanese law reserves certain rights for citizens of original nationality or conditions the exercise of some rights upon the passage of a specific period after the acquisition of nationality.

The issue becomes even more sensitive because the effect of the naturalization decree is constitutive rather than declaratory. In other words, the naturalized individual is considered Lebanese from the date of the decision, not from birth. This affects rights that require a period of possession of nationality, such as eligibility for public office and certain professional syndicate requirements.

Opinions regarding the 1994 decree were divided from the outset. One camp regarded it as a necessary step to remedy a historical injustice suffered by residents deprived of citizenship rights, while another viewed it as a dangerous demographic and social transformation. Among the most prominent opponents was the Maronite League, which promptly filed an appeal before the Council of State in 1994 seeking the annulment of the decree on the grounds of illegality.

During the review period extending from 1994 to 2003, and despite the refusal to suspend implementation, the nationality of many beneficiaries effectively became a contested nationality in the eyes of both the public and administrative authorities. This resulted in the denial or delay of numerous rights and transactions.

Among the most significant consequences was the reported obstruction of procedures related to correcting civil registry records and registering marriages and births that had occurred prior to the issuance of the decree, on the grounds that the dispute remained unresolved. The Civil Court of Cassation adopted the practice of postponing decisions on such applications until the judicial review had been settled.

Behind the scenes of this review, after the state initially refused to hand over the naturalization files, the Council of State appointed a judicial committee to visit the Ministry of Interior and personally investigate a sample of the files. The committee concluded that there were numerous errors, deficiencies, and supporting documents of varying evidentiary value.

Notably, the state initially adopted a defensive position, arguing that naturalization constituted a sovereign act of government beyond the scope of judicial review and denying any procedural irregularities. It later retreated from that position after establishing an administrative committee to review the files and acknowledged the existence of violations, including cases of forgery and the naturalization of Palestinians. At the same time, it disclaimed any responsibility and placed the blame entirely on the naturalized persons, arguing that they had engaged in deception and fraud amounting to “impersonation of nationality.”

Why was the decree challenged?

Among the principal objections raised in both judicial and public debate was the alleged violation of constitutional and legislative procedures. Opponents argued that the decree granted citizenship collectively, en bloc, to hundreds of thousands of individuals without being submitted to the Council of Ministers, contrary to Articles 6 and 65 of the Constitution. In their view, such a measure required the enactment of a law by Parliament rather than the mere issuance of an administrative decree.

It also emerged that the decree had been issued before the completion of a report by a ministerial committee that had been established at the time to prepare draft legislation and submit it to Parliament as a solution to the issue of residents seeking citizenship.

Another objection concerned the alleged violation of the principle of equality and the claim that the decree created a serious imbalance in Lebanon’s internal demographic and sectarian equilibrium. Opponents further argued that it conflicted with the public interest and constituted a step toward settlement, which they contended is constitutionally prohibited.

Particularly relevant in this regard is the explicit provision in the preamble to the Lebanese Constitution stating that there shall be “no partition, no division, and no settlement.”

What further intensified the controversy was the summary report later presented by then Interior Minister Ahmad Fatfat to the National Dialogue Committee on 13 March 2006. The report indicated that Lebanese nationality had been granted to 71,747 Palestinians under the cover of other categories, distributed as follows:

Unregistered persons: 14,112

Holders of “under study” nationality status: 32,564

Residents and descendants of the 7 Villages: 25,071

This was despite the fact that the names of these individuals were recorded with the Directorate of Palestinian Refugee Affairs in Lebanon.

The appeal also relied on the absence of legal reasoning and the failure to explain the factual basis upon which the decision was founded. In addition, critics objected to the inclusion of tens of thousands of individuals without any individualized review of their files or verification that each person satisfied the legal conditions for naturalization in accordance with established legal procedures.

2003: A judicial decision that opened a new phase instead of closing the file

As judicial delays persisted and the appeal remained unresolved for years, parliamentary pressure emerged in late June 2002. Members of Parliament Neemtallah Abi Nasr, Salah Honein, and Gabriel Murr submitted a question to the government in which they warned that the file had “begun to move toward politicization” and that there was “blatant interference in judicial affairs” eight years after the appeal had been filed. The MPs called for correcting the mistake by revoking citizenship from those who did not deserve it and granting it to those who did.

As a result of these and other pressures, and nearly nine years after the appeal had been lodged, the well-known decision of the Council of State was issued on 7 May 2003, commonly referred to as Decision No. 484/2002-2003.

One of the most significant aspects unanimously established by the ruling was the recognition of the standing and legal interest of the challenging party, given the potential consequences for internal balances and national coexistence. In doing so, the decision indirectly reinforced the connection between naturalization mechanisms and sectarian balances, as though naturalization were not granted solely on the basis of individual eligibility but were also evaluated through the prism of sectarian interests.

The Council rejected the state's argument that naturalization constituted a sovereign act of government beyond judicial review and affirmed that it was subject to judicial oversight. It also established that the decree was marred by numerous defects. However, rather than annulling the decree wholly or partially, it referred the matter to the Ministry of Interior, authorizing it to re-examine cases in which citizenship appeared to have been granted unlawfully, through fraud, forgery, or in violation of the law and the Constitution.

It was precisely at this point that the fragility of the situation became entrenched. Instead of resolving the dispute through a definitive judicial ruling, the decision shifted the burden to the administration. The Council justified its position by citing an “absolute material impossibility” of scrutinizing such an enormous number of files without undermining the proper administration of justice.

At the same time, however, it failed to provide the administration with any specific guidelines or clear deadlines. As a result, the naturalized persons remained in a prolonged state of uncertainty, while the confirmation of their nationality became dependent on changing administrations, political decisions, and bureaucratic delays. In practice, the judicial ruling produced results contrary to the legal-stability considerations upon which it purportedly relied.

Administrative delays, self-imposed paralysis, and limited revocation decrees

Following the judicial decision, a new phase began; one that may be described as the period of administrative reconsideration of naturalization files, extending from 2003 to the present day. This phase witnessed what could be described as administrative “ping-pong,” reflecting the absence of political will to reach a final resolution.

On 7 August 2003, then Interior Minister Elias Murr issued a decision establishing a high-level committee to re-examine the files. In November of the same year, the committee received detailed memoranda identifying individuals who had obtained citizenship while serving prison sentences for criminal offenses, in addition to hundreds of Palestinians.

Based on the committee's report, Minister Murr prepared, on 12 July 2004, a draft decree as a first step toward revoking citizenship from 1,940 individuals. However, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers returned the draft unsigned, requesting that each concerned minister verify the names.

Subsequently, on 22 December 2005, Interior Minister Suleiman Frangieh resubmitted the draft after revising it and adding the required justifications. Yet the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers once again returned it without signature.

This paralysis prompted members of Parliament, as well as successive governments, to repeatedly warn of the dangers of leaving the file unresolved. Warnings also multiplied regarding the use of administrative loopholes, such as circulars relating to 150-square-meter building permits, as a concealed avenue for the settlement or naturalization of additional groups, particularly Syrians and Palestinians.

Despite commitments made in the ministerial statements of successive governments, including the Government of National Unity and the government headed by Prime Minister Najib Mikati, to implement the Council of State's decision, actual implementation remained suspended and partial.

Only on 28 October 2011 were limited citizenship-revocation decrees finally issued, namely Decrees Nos. 6690 and 6691. These affected approximately 200 files and included categories such as:

- Unregistered persons later found to have non-Lebanese origins;

- Palestinians registered in the records of the Directorate of Palestinian Refugee Affairs in Lebanon;

- Cases involving inaccurate personal information;

- A case involving a criminal conviction at the time the naturalization application was submitted.

Naturally, these limited revocation decrees opened the door to a new series of appeals before the Council of State.

The judiciary and the administration: Toward the institutionalization of citizenship’s fragility

In the litigation surrounding citizenship revocation, a broad judicial trend emerged that granted the administration the right to revoke citizenship at any time whenever it was proven that it had been granted unlawfully or obtained through fraud or forgery. This approach was justified on the grounds that Lebanese law does not prescribe a limitation period for such actions, unlike the laws of many other countries, and on the basis of the well-known legal principle that fraud vitiates everything.

Conversely, noteworthy dissenting opinions emerged that sought to safeguard the rights of naturalized persons and protect legal certainty.

Among the most prominent was the dissenting opinion of Judge-Counselor Tarek Majzoub, who argued that Lebanese law does not explicitly provide fraud or forgery as grounds for revoking citizenship and that the legislature's silence regarding a limitation period should not be interpreted as permitting arbitrary revocation. He based this position on the principle of protecting legitimate expectations.

He further noted that the administration had been aware of the alleged violations for years and had failed to address them. He therefore rejected the idea that revocation of citizenship, as a personal sanction, should extend to family members who had acquired nationality by dependency, invoking the principle that penalties are personal in nature.

At the same time, the Council of State adopted positions in certain cases that were regarded as pioneering in efforts to reduce statelessness.

For the first time, the Council declared that naturalization could constitute a necessary solution and dealt with concepts such as maktoum al-qayd (“unregistered person”) in a manner consistent with the international definition of a stateless person, drawing upon a 2011 study by the Frontiers Ruwad Association.

The Council held that the use of the term maktoum al-qayd in an application did not constitute forgery, even where the individual had other origins. It also dispensed with the requirement of holding an official residence permit, accepting actual residence as sufficient for stateless persons.

Ultimately, the Council affirmed the legitimacy of naturalization decisions as a mechanism for integrating such groups on the basis of acquisitive prescription, in a manner consistent with Lebanon's international obligations.

The 1994 conundrum: A legacy that haunts subsequent decrees

It is impossible to conclude the discussion on the 1994 decree without noting that it created a Lebanese “conundrum” or phobia toward any measure related to granting citizenship. This decree stripped the naturalization process of its sovereign and legal character, which is supposed to be based on transparent criteria and distinguished services rendered to the state, and transformed it in the public consciousness into a synonym for deals, demographic distortion, and patronage.

This conundrum produced an administrative convention marked by secrecy, whereby naturalization decrees are often passed in the final quarter of presidential terms, away from public scrutiny and without publication in the Official Gazette, in order to avoid oversight and controversy. Among the most prominent examples are the decrees issued during the tenure of President Michel Suleiman. In addition to two decrees issued in March 2013 covering 110 individuals, as well as a decree restoring citizenship, President Suleiman issued, on the eve of the end of his term on 19 May 2014, a controversial decree granting citizenship to 644 individuals.

This decree, politically and media-wise described as having been passed “at night” and without any publicity, included Syrian opposition figures, Arab businessmen, and registered Palestinians, alongside a limited number of genuinely eligible stateless persons. Due to Lebanon’s burdened memory of the 1994 abuses, the decree did not pass unnoticed. Rather, it faced a series of protests from civil campaigns such as “My Citizenship Is a Right for Me and My Family,” in addition to legal challenges before the State Council (Shura Council). These reactions came amid legitimate questions regarding the absence of transparent mechanisms, lack of criteria, and the intercessions that led to the inclusion of some names while excluding others who were more deserving.

The storm was repeated with Naturalization Decree No. 294 signed by President Michel Aoun in 2018. Although the number was limited, around 400 individuals, the inclusion of businessmen and wealthy Syrian and Palestinian figures, some of whom were surrounded by question marks, triggered an immediate political and popular wave of rejection and legal appeals. The intensity of public and political pressure, naturally influenced by the repercussions of 1994, reached the point where the Presidency of the Republic requested that the General Directorate of General Security re-examine the names after the decree had been issued.

Thus, it becomes clear that the 1994 decree was not merely a passing historical event, but rather laid the foundation for a sustained state of distrust between citizens and the state in everything related to identity. Every naturalization decree, regardless of its size, has since been pre-judged in the Lebanese public court on the basis of precedents of political exploitation and clientelism entrenched by that foundational decree.

Roadmap: How can the file be closed?

Closing the file requires a decisive decision of full annulment. It is inconceivable that a structural and demographic wound of this magnitude should continue to bleed for decades under administrative procrastination. A decree issued in anticipation of legislative action, in disregard of due process, and which caused a structural imbalance, requires a bold sovereign decision to nullify its effects. What is needed is a strict timetable for the collective withdrawal of citizenships granted unlawfully, and the final correction of civil registry records.

Immediate action should be taken to revoke citizenship based on constitutional prohibitions. Since the Lebanese Constitution explicitly states in its preamble “no partition, no division, no settlement,” this supreme constitutional principle invalidates any subordinate text. Accordingly, the foundational legislative step must be the revocation of citizenship from tens of thousands of naturalized individuals who were granted it in violation of three major prohibitions: pending registration cases, the Seven Villages issue, and those whose citizenship was revoked. Revoking citizenship in these cases is not merely an administrative measure, but a direct and necessary application of the Constitution to protect the entity from disguised settlement and as a natural recognition of one of the core defects of the decree.

Declaration of invalidity of the underlying basis of the decree. Instead of becoming mired in endless committees and individual verifications that take decades, the state should proceed from the following legal principle: what is built on void is void. Reviews by the State Council and subsequent committees have demonstrated the extent of fraud, patronage, and violations, rendering the entire decree devoid of legality and justifying the withdrawal of its effects.

A strict legal mechanism for implementation without political pressure. A fast-track implementation mechanism must be adopted to cancel questionable naturalizations and notify concerned individuals with reasoned decisions based on the original nullity of the decree. In rare cases where individuals genuinely deserve Lebanese citizenship on their own merits, their cases should be handled through separate legal channels unrelated to this decree, so that legitimate cases are not used as a pretext to shield tens of thousands of unqualified beneficiaries.

Immediate activation of the five-year absence rule. Pending full annulment, the state must remind public opinion of and enforce the Lebanese legal provision that automatically revokes citizenship from any naturalized person who has been absent from Lebanon for five consecutive years, as well as those affiliated with organizations that join a foreign state. If strictly applied today, this provision alone would initiate a cleansing of the records and immediately revoke citizenship from tens of thousands who acquired it in absentia and whose only link to Lebanon is a document used for political purposes.

Safeguarding identity and reforming nationality law. The annulment of the 1994 decree should not be the end point; it must be accompanied by radical legislative reform to prevent the recurrence of such a demographic catastrophe. New legal provisions are required that categorically prohibit mass naturalization and strictly limit citizenship-granting powers through sovereign safeguards that protect Lebanon’s demographic structure and prevent any future attempts to impose similar pathways.

Timeline:

- 20 June 1994: Issuance of Decree 5247/1994.

- 1994: Appeal by the Maronite League before the State Council.

- 2002: Parliamentary initiative, involving Nematallah Abi Nasr, Salah Honein, and Gabriel Murr, warning against procrastination and politicization of the file.

- 1994–2003: Phase of judicial review and appointment of inspection committees.

- 7 May 2003: State Council decision referring the review to the Ministry of Interior.

- 2004–2005: The Ministry of Interior prepares decrees to revoke citizenship from 1,940 individuals; the Prime Minister’s Office obstructs signing and returns them.

- 2003 to present: Ongoing administrative reassessment phase, marked by intermittent and slow verification.

- 28 October 2011: Citizenship revocation decrees affecting approximately 200 files only, with new appeals opened.